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Although a jamming attack is an important problem in Wi-Fi networks, there is no effective solution to this
problem yet. In this paper, we propose a new approach to resolve jamming attacks in Wi-Fi networks based on
the concept of channel hopping. If we assume that the attacker does not jam all the channels simultaneously, then
it might be possible to circumvent a jamming attack by changing the channel. A channel hopping mechanism is
designed so that the access point (AP) and a normal user can agree on the next channel with a high probability
without pre-sharing of any secret information between the AP and a user node. The proposed scheme is evaluated
through experiment in a test bed.1 Introduction
Wireless local area networks (LANs) are getting more
popular nowadays because of easy deployment and the
introduction of diverse types of Wi-Fi devices. However,
despite all the advantages offered, wireless communica-
tion suffers from security vulnerabilities, such as jam-
ming attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, or man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attacks. One important issue among
them is the jamming attack. An attacker with a radio
transceiver intercepts a transmission, injects spurious
packets, and blocks or jams the legitimate transmission
[1–3]. The shared nature of the wireless medium allows
the jammer to disable the entire network within the
radio range. In this case, the jamming attack is regarded
as a wireless version of a DoS attack. As the usage of
wireless networks gets more prevalent, the jamming at-
tack might influence a wider range of users, including
military or business networks. Jammers can be classified
according to their method: constant jammers, deceptive
jammers, random jammers, and reactive jammers [2]. A
constant jammer continuously sends jamming signals to
interfere with the victim. A deceptive jammer constantly
injects regular packets and keeps the channel busy all
the time. Instead of sending continuous jamming signals,
a random jammer sends a jamming signal randomly* Correspondence: synam@ynu.ac.kr
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signal after sensing transmission on the current channel.
Reactive jamming is considered more sophisticated
than other methods, because detection of reactive jam-
mers is more difficult, and they can launch different
jamming attacks in the physical layer or the medium ac-
cess control (MAC) layer. Moreover, the reactive jam-
ming method is energy efficient and can be done with
any Wi-Fi-equipped device. In this paper, we model the
attacker node after the reactive jammer.
Several approaches have been proposed to prevent
jamming [4–6]. Channel hopping is one of the most
practical approaches, because it might enable packet de-
livery even in the presence of jammers. One of the crit-
ical issues for this method is that the next channel
should be determined without prior negotiation. If any
prior negotiation is done by exchanging messages be-
tween users, those messages might be intercepted by the
attackers, resulting in disclosure of the next channel to
the attacker. Another problem is, if we consider a Wi-Fi
hot spot where users come and go frequently, it may not
be easy to exchange messages with the access point (AP)
in the presence of an attacker.
In order to overcome the limitations of prior negotiation-
based schemes, we propose a channel hopping mechanism
that provides channel agreement between user nodes
and the AP without prior negotiation. We use trans-
mission power and received signal strength (RSS) to
derive a channel number common to both the user
and the AP.is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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of each other, a network administrator usually assigns
the channel for each AP manually to minimize interfer-
ence between them, or the APs search for the least con-
gested channel, usually among the non-overlapping
channels, by themselves [7]. However, Mishra et al. [8]
showed that the total capacity of a wireless LAN can be
improved by using partially overlapped channels among
adjacent APs, rather than using only non-overlapping
channels. When a specific AP is within the commu-
nication range of a jammer, even though the AP se-
lects a partially overlapped channel as the next
channel, the application traffic throughput may not
be zero, depending on the physical distance between
the AP and the jammer and the channel separation.
Thus, in our proposed scheme we consider any
channel except the jammed channel as a candidate
for the next channel in order to lower the prediction
ability of the jammer.
When the AP and the user select the next channel
under a jamming attack, if they know the channel num-
bers used by other adjacent APs, then it would be better
to avoid those channels as the next selection. However,
when APs are densely deployed, it may not be easy to
find any remaining non-overlapping channel. Further-
more, interfering channels monitored by a specific AP
might be different from the channels monitored by a
user node due to the hidden terminal problem. Thus,
any channel except the jammed channel would be con-
sidered a candidate for the next channel in our proposed
scheme, as mentioned above.
The contributions of our work can be summarized
as follows.
 We propose a new channel hopping scheme that
does not require prior negotiation.
 Using transmission power and received signal
strength, we determine the next channel, and
implementation of the scheme does not require
special devices, such as a frequency hopping
spread spectrum transmitter and a receiver. Thus,
the proposed scheme can be deployed in existing
wireless networks.
 We analytically investigate the effect of the proposed
channel hopping scheme on throughput.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review the existing approaches. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce the signal strength-based channel
number generation scheme. In Section 4, we analyze
the effect of the channel selection algorithm on
throughput. Sections 5 and 6 describe the experiment
topology and the experiment results, respectively. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper.2 Related work
Several channel surfing approaches have been proposed
in the past [9–11]. Those approaches can be classified
into two types: proactive and reactive.
In proactive approaches, the user node and AP change
channels periodically at an interval of fixed length with-
out checking for jammers [4, 10]. One disadvantage to
this approach is that the nodes must change channels
persistently, even when there is no jammer. This kind of
unnecessary channel switching lowers throughput sig-
nificantly. Moreover, if the next channel is determined
according to a specific pattern, the scheme may not
work when that pattern is detected by an attacker.
In reactive approaches, the AP and the user nodes
start to change their channels after the detection of
channel jamming [12, 13]. Several techniques have been
proposed to detect channel jamming [14–19]. However,
the main issue in this approach is to derive a new chan-
nel number that is common to both APs and users. If a
jamming attack starts, it may not be possible to exchange
messages between the APs and users. Most approaches
rely on prior channel negotiation.
In order to implement a reactive approach, it is first
necessary to detect jamming. Well-known jamming de-
tection methods usually use packet delivery ratio, packet
loss rate, packet latency, and signal strength [2, 14, 17].
Jamming detection schemes can be classified into two
categories: the signal strength consistency-based approach
and the location consistency-based approach. In the signal
strength consistency-based approach, a low packet deliv-
ery ratio and a high received signal strength usually
indicate a jamming attack. A location consistency-based
approach determines the location of a node and measures
throughput. If the throughput is low for a node that is
close by, it might be due to a jamming attack. The signal
strength consistency-based approach of Xu et al. [2] is
used to detect a jamming attack in our proposed scheme.
Navda et al. [4] proposed a proactive channel hopping
protocol with pseudo-random channels to avoid jam-
ming. They assumed that the sequence of hopping chan-
nels is pseudo-random, and it is difficult to predict the
next channel. However, a pseudo-randomly generated
sequence is not truly random, because it is completely
determined by a relatively small set of initial values.
Thus, using a previous channel hopping sequence, the
attacker might calculate or predict the next channel.
They assumed that the channel sequence is only known
to legitimate users and the AP. Another limitation of
this approach is that it may not work in public Wi-Fi
hot spots, where people come and leave frequently. If
the users do not know the seed for the pseudo-random
scheme, they cannot predict the next channel.
Frequency hopping is similar to channel surfing in that
both of them change frequency during communications,
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which requires more advanced transceivers, while
channel hopping is a link-layer technology that can
be applied to existing wireless devices without a fre-
quency hopping feature. Lee et al. [5] proposed a
frequency hopping method that does not require
pre-key establishment before data transmission. Al-
though they introduced a scheme to make different
nodes meet on the same channel without any pre-
shared information under a jamming attack, they do
not discuss how different nodes can change channels
in a synchronized manner afterwards. The quorum ren-
dezvous channel hopping scheme [5] guarantees at least
one rendezvous between two different nodes within c time
slots, where c is the total number of available channels.
Thus, if the channel hopping scheme proposed in [5] is
used repeatedly, even after the first channel agreement,
the throughput is likely to remain low for a large c. Con-
trarily, we design a channel hopping scheme carefully so
as to maintain the agreement of the channels between the
AP and a user node over adjacent time slots.
Yang et al. [20] and Tang et al. [21] investigated
the issue of optimal power control for a user in the
presence of a smart jammer. They modeled the
power control problem with a smart jammer as a
Stackelberg game [22] and investigated an optimal
strategy to control the transmission power of the
user with a utility defined based on the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) reward and
power consumption penalty. However, the utility did
not include the factor of throughput between the
legitimate transmitter and receiver, which is an im-
portant performance metric in wireless LAN envi-
ronments. When the channel of an AP is fixed, if anTable 1 Major parameters and variables
Notations Meaning
δ0 Clear channel assessment (CCA) level for 802.11g
S Adjusted RSS value, i.e., summation of its own tran
δ Group size, i.e., a margin to determine the similarit
Tx(i,j) Transmission power of node i for the jth packet
Rx(k,l) Received signal strength of the lth packet measure
Δ Channel switching time (= channel sojourn time =
Cn Channel number in the nth time slot
c Number of available channels in 802.11g
ron Average traffic rate during the time slot where the
ra
ran Average throughput when the AP and the user no
ra
sel Average throughput when the AP and the user no
pe Channel disagreement probability, i.e., probability t
the condition they stay on the same channel in th
pa Probability that the AP and the user node select th
different channels in the current time slotattacker jams that channel continuously, simple
power control on that channel may not be enough
to overcome a low-throughput problem. Channel
switching might be needed in this case. However,
channel switching, i.e., coordinated channel switch-
ing between the AP and a user node, has not been
specifically discussed in those game theory-based ap-
proaches yet.
3 Signal strength-based channel number
generation
Wireless channel signal strength is measured as a nega-
tive number in decibel-milliwatts (dBm). In 802.11 wire-
less networks, clear channel assessment (CCA) is
defined as a lower bound of energy for decoding of a
wireless signal. Energy detection is based on receiving a
valid signal at the start of a transmission slot, with a
signal power of −76 dBm or greater for the 802.11g
standard. If the signal strength of the frames is less
than −76 dBm, then a user usually disconnects [23].
Table 1 describes the major parameters and variables
required to explain our proposed scheme.
The received signal strength depends on the dis-
tance between the user and the AP. If two user nodes
stay at two different positions from the AP, they have
different signal strength values for the frames coming
from the AP. That means we can measure different
signal strengths from different locations around the
AP. Even though an attacker is located near a user,
the signal strength measured by the attacker might be
different from that of the user. Thus, it is not easy to
measure signal strength between two remote nodes.
We will use this feature as a key to determine the
next channel [24, 25].smission power and received signal strength
y between two different RSS values
d at node k
time slot)
AP and a user node stays on the same channel
de randomly select the next channel
de select the next channel according to our proposed scheme
hat the AP and a user node select different next channel numbers under
e current time slot
e same next channel number under the condition that they stay on
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procity declares that bidirectional wireless channel states
should be identical between two transceivers at a given
instant of time. However, this may not always be true in
a real environment.
Let us assume that the AP and a user node exchange
two frames, one in each direction, and measure the sig-
nal strength at the same time. Let S1 and S2 denote the
signal strength (in dBm) measured by the AP and by the
user node, respectively. If we compare S1 and S2 as float-
ing point numbers, they might be close to each other,
but a complete agreement between them will be a very
rare event. This means that if each node attempts to
generate the next channel number using S1 or S2 at
floating point precision, then they are not likely to agree
on the same channel number.
Thus, it is necessary to design the channel number
generation algorithm based on the similarity between S1
and S2, but not based on equality between them, even to
floating point precision. To resolve this issue, we divide
a possible range of signal strengths into subintervals of a
fixed length, as shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, if the measured signal strength belongs to
the interval [δ0 + (i − 1)δ, δ0 + iδ], then that signal
strength belongs to group Gi, and the next channel is
generated using group index i instead of the signal
strength value itself to induce the same next channel
number, assuming the measured signal strength values
are similar between the AP and user node. The group
size δ determines the resolution for signal strength
comparison.
3.1 Next channel number generation scheme
If a legitimate client and the AP communicate on a
static channel, jammers can easily identify the channel
and can jam that channel indefinitely. Hopping methods
usually require legitimate users to move to another
channel in order to avoid the jammer. There are two
approaches to avoid jamming: proactive and reactive.
Our proposed scheme follows the reactive approach, and
in our scheme, each user node and the AP move to
another channel only after finding that the current chan-
nel is jammed.
When a jamming signal is detected, the AP and the
user node choose the next channel to move based on
the symmetry of signal strength over the bidirectionalFig. 1 Division of a signal strength range into intervals of fixed width δwireless channel between them. We consider the packet
transmissions between two arbitrary nodes, node A and
node B, in Fig. 2. In the figure, Tx(i,k) denotes the trans-
mission power of node i for the kth packet, and simi-
larly, Rx(j,k) indicates the received signal strength of the
kth packet measured at node j. We denote the channel
gain from node A to B as H(A,B,k) for the kth packet
transmission. Then, the following equations hold:
Rx B; 1ð Þ¼Tx A; 1ð ÞþH A;B; 1ð Þ;
Rx A; 2ð Þ¼Tx B; 2ð ÞþH B;A; 2ð Þ;
where every power and channel gain are in dBm.
Thus, assuming that H(A,B,1) =H(B,A,2), we obtain
Tx A; 1ð Þ‐Rx B; 1ð Þ ¼ Tx B; 2ð Þ‐Rx A; 2ð Þ: ð1Þ
If node B can receive the value of Tx(A,1) from node
A and node A can receive the value of Tx(B,2) from
node B, then these two nodes can use (Tx(A,1) −
Rx(B,1)) or (Tx(B,2) − Rx(A,2)) as a seed to generate the
next channel number because of the equality between
them in Eq. (1). However, in this case, there will be an
additional communication overhead to deliver the
transmission power information to the other side. This
communication overhead issue can be resolved in the
following way. Equation (1) can be rearranged to
Tx A; 1ð ÞþRx A; 2ð Þ¼Tx B; 2ð ÞþRx B; 1ð Þ: ð2Þ
Tx(A,1) on the left-hand side of the above equation is
the packet transmission power at node A. Because the
transmission power at node A is determined by node A,
node A knows the value of Tx(A,1). Rx(A,2) is the re-
ceived signal strength measured by node A for the sec-
ond packet. Thus, node A knows this value as well.
Node B knows the values of Tx(B,2) and Rx(B,1) for
similar reasons. Equation (2) can be summarized as fol-
lows. Even when the transmission power is different be-
tween two communicating nodes, if they add their own
transmission power (in dBm) to the received signal
strength (in dBm), then the two communicating nodes
can obtain the same summation value by Eq. (2), which
is referred to as adjusted RSS value in this paper, in case
of path loss symmetry on the bidirectional channel. S
denotes the most recent value of adjusted RSS, and this
Fig. 2 Packet transmission between two nodes in case of path
loss symmetry
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number.
In order to calculate the next channel, we build a
formula. As input values, we use the previous channel
number Cn − 1 and the adjusted RSS value S. If there is
no previous channel, then Cn − 1 = 0. We generate the
next channel number according to the following
equation:
Cn¼h ⌊ S–δ0ð Þ=δ⌋ Cn‐1kð Þ%c; ð3Þ
where c is the number of available channels, h() is a uni-
form random hash function, and x||y means bit-level
concatenation of x and y, and we use MD5 for h() in this
paper. ⌊x⌋ is the largest integer that is less than or equal
to x. The outcome of the hash function will be a non-
negative integer, but it can be a large number, although
the number of available channels is usually limited to a
small number. In this paper, we consider IEEE 802.11g,
and, thus, the number of channels is 11. We apply the
modular operator % to map a large integer, the outcome
of the hash function, to one of the available channel
numbers with c of 11. We use ⌊(S − δ0)/δ⌋, which is re-
ferred to as the quantized RSS value in this paper, in-
stead of the adjusted RSS value (S) itself in order to
increase the channel agreement probability between the
AP and the user, as explained in Fig. 1.
According to Eq. (3), the next channel number Cn is
determined based on the previous channel number Cn − 1
and the adjusted RSS value S. Thus, the AP and the user
node that share the same previous channel number are
likely to share the same next channel number as long as
they observe a similar signal strength.Our scheme is based on the reciprocity of wireless
channels, meaning that the channel gain between two
nodes is identical when the role of each node changes,
i.e., the transmitter becomes the receiver while the re-
ceiver becomes the transmitter. It is well known that
channel reciprocity holds even in multipath fading chan-
nels with slow/fast fading [27, 28]. In practice, however,
channel reciprocity may not always be true, since the
channel measurement times are not identical at each
node, and the noise level depends on the transceiver cir-
cuit. Indeed, there are many approaches to ensure chan-
nel reciprocity in wireless systems, such as interpolation
and filtering [28]. The interpolation methods emulate
the identical channel measurement times at the nodes
[29, 30] and the filtering methods eliminate the high fre-
quency components in noise [31, 32]. Unfortunately,
these techniques are not perfect. That is the reason we
use the quantized RSS value in Eq. (3) instead of the ad-
justed RSS value, as is. As the signal strength group size
δ increases, our scheme becomes more robust to imper-
fect channel reciprocity. However, when δ increases, the
attacker might easily obtain the quantized RSS value of
the user node or the AP from its own signal strength
measurement. If the attacker can calculate the next
channel from Eq. (3) in this case, the throughput will be
lowered again. We analyze the effect of δ on throughput
through experiment in Section 6.
3.2 Attacker model
We assume that the attacker is fully aware of our
proposed protocol. We assume that the jammer node
also has the same performance as a usual node, and the
jammer cannot jam all channels at the same time. We
consider a reactive jammer model in this paper. In more
detail, the attacker first attempts to guess the channel
number of the AP according to the formula of our
proposed protocol, i.e., Eq. (3). If there is a hit on the
channel number, then the attacker launches a jamming
attack. Otherwise, the attacker scans the busy channel
and launches a jamming attack on the detected busy
channel until the AP leaves the channel. If the AP
changes channels, then the attacker repeats the same
attack pattern of channel guessing, scanning, and
jamming. The attacker uses a MAC layer jamming at-
tack method.
4 Effect of channel selection scheme on
throughput
In this section, we analyze the effect of the proposed
channel selection scheme on throughput. We considered
packet exchange between an AP and a specific user
node. According to the channel switching model consid-
ered in this paper, each AP and user node change chan-
nels periodically at an interval of Δ after detection of a
Fig. 3 Alternating idle and busy periods over time, under channel hopping
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stay on the selected channel during a fixed interval of
Δ, also called a time slot. If the AP and the user node
select the same channel number in a given time slot,
then that time slot is called the A (agreement) slot. If
the selected channel numbers do not agree with each
other, then that time slot is called a D (disagreement)
slot. Consecutive D slots constitute an idle (I) period,
and consecutive A slots constitute a busy (B) period.
Figure 3 describes the relation among A/D slots and
I/B periods again with an example. We can easily find
that the I and B periods always alternate. If ron repre-
sents the average traffic rate from the user node to
the AP during an A slot, the average throughput (ra)
can be expressed as
ra ¼ E B½   ronE I½  þ E B½  : ð4Þ
Let us first consider the average throughput (ra
ran)
when the AP and the user node randomly select the
next channel. If the number of available channels is c,
then the probability that the AP and the user node
select the same channel the next time is 1/c. In this
case, the busy period (B) is geometrically distributed,
since the channel agreement probabilities for two
consecutive time slots are independent of each other.







; n ¼ 1; 2; 3;
Then, the expectation of B (E[B]) can be obtained as
E B½  ¼
X∞
n¼1



















The idle period (I) has the following geometric
distribution:





; n ¼ 1; 2; 3;
Then, the expectation of I (E[I]) can be obtained as
E I½  ¼
X∞
n¼1













Δ ¼ c−1ð ÞΔ:
ð6Þ
Combining Eqs. (4), (5), and (6) yields
Table 2 Specification of each node involved in the experiment
CPU RAM OS Network adapter
AP 2.3 GHz Quad Core 2 GB Ubuntu 12.04 LTS 3Com a/b/g
Attacker 1.4 GHz Intel Celeron 2 GB Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Atheros AR5822
Wireless user node 1.4 GHz Intel Celeron 2 GB Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Atheros AR5822
Wired user node 1.4 GHz Intel Celeron 2 GB Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Netlink BCM5778
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ron
c−1ð Þ2 þ 1 : ð7Þ
We next consider the average throughput (ra
sel) when
the AP and the user node select the next channel ac-
cording to our proposed scheme. In our scheme, the
probability that the AP and the user node select the
same next channel can be different, depending on
whether they are currently on the same channel. If the
AP and the user node stay on the same channel in the
current time slot, then they can select the same channel
again with a very high probability of 1 − pe, according to
the algorithm described in Section 3, where pe is the
channel disagreement probability between the AP and a
user node from inconsistent signal strength measure-
ment. However, they may select a different channel with
a low probability of pe if the adjusted RSS values are sig-
nificantly different between those two nodes.
Let pa denote the probability that the AP and the
user node select the same next channel number
under the condition that they stay on different chan-
nels in the current time slot. If the AP and the user
node stay on a different channel in the current time
slot, then the user node first detects the discrepancy
between its own channel number and the channel
number of the AP and actively scans the channels to
find the channel of the AP. The user node can find
the next channel correctly only when it acquires theFig. 5 Throughput of the proposed scheme for various channel switchingchannel number of the AP in a given time slot, and
the quantized RSS value of the node agrees with that
value of the AP by Eq. (3). Although the user node
attempts to search for the channel of the AP in this
case, that search may not always be successful, that
is, pa may not always be equal to 1 because the chan-
nel scanning time can vary dynamically, on the order
of hundreds of milliseconds in 802.11 networks [33].
We now investigate the distribution of the busy period
(B) and the idle period (I) in detail. The time slot just
before the idle period is always A slot from the explan-
ation given for Fig. 3. There will be no idle period if an-
other A slot comes after the previous A slot. Two
consecutive A slots occur with a probability of 1 − pe by
the definition of pe. Thus, we can obtain the following
distribution of I:
Pr I ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1−pe;
Pr I ¼ nΔð Þ ¼ pe 1−pað Þn−1 pa; n ¼ 1; 2; 3; …
From the distribution of I, E[I] can be obtained as
E I½  ¼
X∞
n¼1









In a similar manner, we can obtain the distribution
of B astimes (or channel sojourn times) in the presence of a jammer
Fig. 6 Throughput of the proposed scheme for different values of δ when there is no attacker
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Pr B ¼ nΔð Þ ¼ pa 1−peð Þn−1 pe; n ¼ 1; 2; 3; …
From the above distribution of B, E[B] can be ob-
tained as
E B½  ¼
X∞
n¼1














If we compare ra
ran in Eq. (7) and ra
sel in Eq. (10), it is
possible to show that ra
sel > ra
ran when c ≥ 2 and pe < pa,
which is likely to be valid for a sufficiently large value of
δ, because pe tends to decrease as δ increases by the
definition of pe. Specifically, when pe (i.e., the channel
disagreement probability) is negligibly small, ra
sel getsFig. 7 Channel agreement probability between two communicating nodesclose to ron, the theoretical upper bound of throughput,
by Eq. (10).
5 Experiment topology
There are four nodes in the experiments: two user nodes
(one wired node and one wireless node), one access
point, and an attacker, as shown in Fig. 4. User nodes
and the attacker use machines at the same level of per-
formance, with an Atheros Wi-Fi chipset. We imple-
mented channel switching in the kernel space for user
nodes, and the attacker was implemented as a user space
application. We modified an ath9k Wi-Fi driver and the
hostapd open source code on the AP side. Table 2 shows
the parameters of the nodes used for the experiments.
All the experiments are done in an IEEE 802.11g
environment (Table 2).
6 Experiment results
We measured the signal strength of the frames from the
user node at the AP and that of the frames from the AP
at the user node. Each user node generates the next
channel independently and moves to that channel. If afor various values of δ when there is no attacker
Fig. 8 Throughput of the proposed scheme for different values of δ when there is an attacker
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user node searches other channels, one by one. We
performed an experiment to investigate the effect of
channel switching time on throughput for our proposed
scheme when there is a jammer. Figure 5 shows
throughput of the proposed scheme for various switch-
ing times. We found that a channel sojourn time of
250 ms gives the highest throughput in the presence of
an attacker in our experiment.
In Fig. 5, when channel switching (channel sojourn)
time increases, the throughput tends to decrease. As we
stay on the selected channel longer, the attacker has a
higher chance of jamming the channel after finding it,
resulting in lower throughput. On the other hand, the
channel switching time should not be too small. There
must be enough time to reconfigure the connection be-
tween the user and the AP. Even though users do not
authenticate and associate after changing channels,Fig. 9 Comparison of analysis result by Eq. (10) with the measurement resuMAC layer access delay might lead to low throughput,
especially when the channel sojourn time is very short
[34]. The channel switching time will be fixed at 250 ms
hereafter, considering the result of Fig. 5.
We next investigate the effect of the group size δ on
throughput through experiment. We first measure the
throughput of the proposed channel switching scheme
for various values of δ when there is no attacker. Figure 6
shows the measurement results. We found that through-
put increases as the value of δ increases. This trend can
be explained as follows. According to Eq. (3), i.e., the
next channel generation formula, δ is a margin in decid-
ing the similarities between two adjusted RSS values
measured between two communicating nodes. Thus,
when the value of δ increases, the channel agreement
probability tends to increase, as shown in Fig. 7, which
was also obtained from experiment. When the channel
agreement probability is high, the AP and the user nodelt when there is no attacker
Table 3 Experiment scenarios
Scenario Test environment
1 Random channel selection without an attacker
2 Proposed scheme without an attacker
3 Random channel selection scheme with an attacker
4 Proposed scheme with an attacker
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ing channels, leading to higher throughput according to
the analysis in Section 4.
Figure 8 shows the throughput of the proposed
scheme for various values of δ when there is an attacker.
The difference between the results of Figs. 6 and 8 can
be summarized as follows. When there is no attacker
(Fig. 6), the throughput increases monotonically when δ
increases, due to improvement of the channel agreement
probability. However, in Fig. 8, the throughput reaches a
peak point when δ = 4 and decreases afterwards. This
trend can be explained as follows. δ is a margin in decid-
ing the similarities between two adjusted RSS values be-
tween two communicating nodes. If the value of δ gets
too large, the probability that the attacker obtains the
correct channel number based on the formula of Eq. (3)
using its own signal strength measurement might in-
crease due to a large margin in the similarity check part
of Eq. (3). Thus, throughput might degrade for large
values of δ, especially when there is an attacker. The
value of δ is fixed at 4 hereafter, based on the experi-
ment result of Fig. 8.
Figure 9 compares the analysis results obtained by Eq.
(10) with the measurement results when there is no
attacker. The horizontal axis represents the channel
disagreement probability, pe, and the vertical axis, the
normalized throughput, i.e., throughput divided by max-
imum throughput. For Eq. (10), ron is the maximumFig. 10 Comparison of the throughput of the random channel selection sc
jammer (scenarios 1 and 2)throughput. Probability pa was measured to be 0.21, and
this value was used for pa in Eq. (10). We find that our
analysis result agrees closely with the experiment data.
Our goal is to improve throughput between a user
node and the AP during the jamming period. We will
compare our proposed scheme with a scheme that ran-
domly selects the next channel. Table 3 explains the sce-
narios considered for subsequent experiments.
We measured the throughput for the random channel
hopping scheme and the throughput for the proposed
scheme and compared them with the throughput for the
normal situation when there is no jammer. There is no
channel hopping under normal circumstances. As we
can see in Fig. 10, the throughput for the random
channel hopping scheme stays very low (close to zero)
because of the disagreement over channel numbers
selected by the AP and the wireless user node.
Figure 10 shows that the proposed scheme yields
much higher throughput compared to the random
channel selection scheme. In the proposed scheme, the
throughput sometimes goes down to zero due to dis-
agreement over channel numbers selected by the AP
and the user node. However, we find that the idle period
due to such disagreements is usually shorter than the
busy period with higher throughput.
Figure 11 compares the throughput of the proposed
scheme with the throughput of the random channel se-
lection scheme when there is a jammer, which behaves
according to the attacker model described in subsection
3.2. We find that the random channel selection scheme
does not effectively resolve the low-throughput issue
when there is a reactive jammer. The throughput of the
proposed scheme is higher than that of the random
channel selection scheme, because the AP and the user
node can select the same next channel with a higher
probability, according to the channel selection schemeheme and the throughput of the proposed scheme when there is no
Fig. 11 Comparison of the throughput of the random channel selection scheme and the throughput of the proposed scheme when there is a
jammer (scenarios 3 and 4)
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11, the throughput is lower for Fig. 11 because of the
interference from the jammer.7 Conclusions
We proposed a new channel hopping scheme to miti-
gate jamming attacks in the wireless LAN environ-
ment. The proposed scheme does not require an
exchange of secret keys between the AP and user
node prior to a jamming attack. This makes it harder
for the attacker to guess the next channel number
under our proposed scheme. The next channel is de-
termined using the previous channel number and a
combination of transmission power and received sig-
nal strength between the AP and user node. Since the
next channel number generation scheme is designed
to exploit the path loss symmetry between the AP
and a user node, they are likely to switch to the same
next channel as long as they stayed on the same
channel previously. In case of an attack, even though
the attacker finds the current busy channel number, it
cannot easily predict the next channel because the
path loss information between the AP and user node
is not available. The effect of the proposed channel
selection scheme on throughput was investigated ana-
lytically, and the experiment results show that mean-
ingful throughput can be achieved with the proposed
scheme in the presence of a jammer, compared to
nearly zero throughput of the random channel selec-
tion scheme.
In this paper, we fixed the number of wireless normal
users to one, just to concentrate on the operation of our
proposed scheme in an adversarial environment. When
there are multiple normal users, we need to consider
both the aggregate throughput of normal users andfairness of throughput for each user. This complicated
issue will be investigated in our future work.
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